As Europe’s re-armament grows likely, a window of opportunity may be opening for India

As Shane Harris and his colleagues report in The Atlantic, President Donald Trump could simply announce on social media that the territory is now a part of the US. Neither Denmark nor any Nato partner would put up a defence because they don’t have the military power to confront the US.

What such an outcome will mean for Nato is another question, but the fact that some European policymakers believe that they could effectively give Washington a military walkover reveals a lot about the state of European preparedness. If the Russian invasion of Ukraine did not, the Trump administration’s actions will make European re- armament an urgent imperative.

Washington’s latest National Security Strategy (NSS) has not only signalled a reversal of an 80-year-old commitment to Europe’s defence, it has also indicated a willingness to politically intervene in Europe by backing right-wing parties. For European capitals, this transforms their security environment.

In the past year, the EU and its member countries have announced a series of measures to boost defence spending. The pathways to European re-armament include a plan for EU member countries to raise defence spending from 2% of GDP to 3.5% in the medium term and further to 5% by 2035.

The EU has cleared the legislative decks for states to run higher fiscal deficits necessary to enable such spending. The coming years will be wrenching for European societies as they are forced to cut spending on welfare and environmental goals to build their armed forces.

Finding the money to finance military equipment will be hard enough, but it will be harder to find adequate numbers of young people to join the armed forces. Convincing young Europeans, raised in prosperous societies, to choose military careers will test political leadership and social cohesion. Forging national armed forces into a unified, credible fighting force will be a long, difficult task.

Nato does provide a framework, but Nato without the US will leave a big hole for someone to fill. Command structures, logistics, intelligence sharing, strategic lift and nuclear deterrence will all look different once Washington is no longer the anchor.

A European military alliance, even if supplemented by Britain and Turkey, will not simply be Nato-minus-America. It will be entirely new, with different politics, command structures, threat perceptions and civil-military relations.

European politics will determine the course of re-armament. If right-wing parties sympathetic to Washington come to power in Germany, France, Britain and Poland, it may proceed in coordination with the US, even if on less deferential terms. If they do not, Europe will attempt to plough an independent furrow. There are pitfalls either way.

If the EU can create a truly unified military force, then differences in the geographical distribution of wealth and demographics will matter less. But if the armed forces are organized around national lines while they fight as part of a European alliance, then the organizational challenges will be more acute. It is unclear if Europe can field a unified fighting force without fiscal unity. Coherent re-armament requires European cohesion. A divided Europe may re-arm slowly, incoherently or not at all.

As the Ukraine war, NSS and Greenland issues have shown, external pressures will determine the tempo of re- armament. Russian behaviour will be decisive. An aggressive Russia will concentrate minds and accelerate decisions that might otherwise be postponed.

Europe’s diplomacy will adjust accordingly. European capitals will seek to keep Chinese support for Russia below a tolerable threshold, recognizing that beyond it, the logic becomes brutally simple: my enemy’s friend is an enemy. Neither Europe nor China want to cross that line, but they will have to manage amid ongoing and perhaps new conflicts ensnaring them.

Within Europe, certain states will matter more. Poland combines rising defence spending, favourable demographics and a frontline geography shaped by centuries of hard experience with Russia. Its influence on European security policy will grow accordingly.

Turkey, meanwhile, could become a swing state. As a Nato member outside the EU with a managed rivalry with Russia, Ankara occupies a strategic grey zone. Will it consider itself and be considered European enough for defence? Turkish and Russian interests may diverge sharply in Europe but converge in West and Central Asia. How Turkey balances these theatres will influence the European security environment.

Britain is also key, provided it can avoid being torn apart by the growing divergence between the US and Europe.

For India, Europe’s re-armament opens a window of opportunity. A Europe less anchored to Washington and more focused on its own security will seek diversified partnerships. As a defence partner, India can help Europe reduce costs through economies of scale. However, India’s ties with Russia and Europe’s with China will limit how much the two can do, and how fast.

The author is co-founder and director of The Takshashila Institution, an independent centre for research and education in public policy.