Baby boom: Andhra Pradesh's child incentives are a bold experiment with a slim chance of success

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The economic impact of a drop-off in births is a global concern.(HT)

Summary

India’s first major state with a plan to arrest its population decline will be up against a global record of demographic policy failure. Can cash handouts and promises of fiscal support defy the sceptics and beget a baby boom?

The government of Andhra Pradesh wants to spur families to have more children. Chief Minister N. Chandrababu Naidu has declared a plan to give families a one-time payment of 30,000 for having a third child and 40,000 for a fourth. In March, a policy had proposed 25,000 for a second child.

The aim, as Naidu has stated, is to shift focus from population “control” to “care” in order to secure the state’s “demographic future.” Apart from cash incentives, a cradle-plus package may include nutritional support for mothers and young children, apart from free public education till age 18 and subsidized reproductive assistance at state-run hospitals.

The state has sought public feedback on this baby-boom project.

For many who lived through India’s population panic of the 1970s, paying people to have more children may seem either ironic or like a warped priority.

Anxiety over ‘overpopulation’ can be traced to a dismal 18th century warning by Thomas Malthus that births multiply while the uptrend of food supply would fail to keep up. He failed to foresee the role of innovation, with contraception just an example.

As proof piled up that human ingenuity could drive productivity and raise living standards, people began to be viewed as an asset—no matter how many.

Today, the economic impact of a drop-off in births is a global concern. In all European countries, the UN-logged total fertility rate (TFR)—the average number of children a woman is expected to have in her lifetime—is below the 2.1 level needed for a stable headcount.

Without an influx of immigrants, any such state stares at an ageing workforce followed by a shrunk domestic market; while both could slow its economy down, the latter may leave a gap even AI bots cannot fill.

America, with a TFR of 1.6, risks losing its dynamism behind high walls with or without jobs shifting to AI agents. In Asia, South Korea’s TFR drop is a case study, but the big story is China’s lurch from one extreme to another.

A decade ago, it gave up its one-child policy and has since been raising birth incentives. To reverse its demographic decline, Beijing uses child care and cash support. This year, it levied a tax on contraceptives.

But with a TFR of about 1, China seems stuck in a ‘low-fertility trap’: once a country’s rate slips below 1.5, recovery is seen to get far harder. Apart from time and financial pressure, social mores and gender gaps in child-rearing tend to restrain family size too.

India is also below the replacement rate. A Sample Registration System report pegs India’s TFR at 1.9 births per woman in 2024. Urban India’s is at 1.5, a cliff-point. According to the Andhra government, the state’s rate is also 1.5. Since it risks losing its share of voice in the Lok Sabha if seats are rejigged by population, a baby boom would be a political win too. Other low-TFR states would be watching.

The global record on rate reversal suggests dismal odds of success. Having babies is so deeply personal that a birth-rate bulge is hard to foster. To arrest a TFR at 1.5 or so has begun to look like trying to roll a rock uphill even for middle-income nations.

Could hearty cash handouts defy the global pattern? Andhra’s subsidy cannot cover the real cost of child-rearing. Yet, cash transfers might find mass takers so long as poverty persists.

If Andhra springs a surprise, it should make everyone sit up. After all, the rest of the country is also on a sharp TFR slide. And India mustn’t get old before it gets rich.

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