China may not be able to end the war in West Asia but it’s in a position to shape what comes next

There’s no doubt the war is reinforcing China’s favoured narrative: that the US under President Donald Trump is a destabilizing force, while Beijing is a reliable pillar of the international order.

It could also give President Xi Jinping a chance to showcase his country’s clout, notwithstanding his reluctance to get drawn into conflicts in West Asia. If it were to step in, Beijing would likely want to help shape a resolution while avoiding the work that comes with enforcement. Any action along those lines would mark a meaningful expansion of its diplomatic influence.

Last week, China—with its close partner Pakistan—took a step towards cementing that image, releasing a five-point plan to end the war. The proposal calls for an immediate ceasefire, the start of talks, protection for civilians and infrastructure and restoring normal passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

On paper, the framework appears reasonable. In practice, it reflects a familiar approach. As with Beijing’s proposals on the Ukraine war, which were widely criticized for favouring Russia, there is no clear mechanism for implementation. Crucially, there is no suggestion for how to keep the strait open. Nor does it address Iran’s nuclear programme, likely to be a sticking point for both the US and Israel.

These omissions make me sceptical about what China can realistically deliver, despite calls from Western analysts for it to provide greater global leadership. Furthermore, Beijing won’t get its hands dirty unless it’s confident participation will be associated with success, said Ja Ian Chong, associate professor in political science at the National University of Singapore.

But Beijing does have skin in this game and therefore an incentive to find a solution. It’s the dominant buyer of Iranian crude, taking roughly 90% of Iran’s exports, much of which moves through Hormuz. For now, China has remained relatively insulated: some shipments have continued and its vast strategic petroleum reserves provide a short term buffer.

A longer war, however, would be far harder to absorb. Damage to energy infrastructure across the Gulf would drive up costs and disrupt trade. For a slowing economy still heavily dependent on seaborne commerce, that matters.

Beijing also has domestic reasons for wanting the war to end quickly, including bringing home Chinese citizens stranded in the Gulf. It’s unclear how many are affected, but last month Beijing said it had rescued more than 10,000. In 2025, over 300,000 Chinese nationals lived in the UAE alone.

This is where the connections it has built over time could come into play. Beijing maintains close ties with Iran, working channels with Israel and a functioning—if strained—relationship with Washington. Its emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference makes it a more acceptable interlocutor for Tehran than most Western powers, and that gives it greater scope to help shape the contours of any settlement.

If China were to play a role in opening the Strait of Hormuz, it would not only secure its own energy requirements but also build goodwill among Asian economies that are among the worst affected by the current fuel crunch.

Although it has limited experience—and probably little interest—in mediating between hostile nations, it has had some success. China’s role in brokering a Saudi Arabia-Iran deal in 2023 showed that it can bring rivals together and deliver diplomatic outcomes.

The breakthrough was hailed as a triumph at the time. In reality, success was narrower than some suggested and this current war has exposed how fragile those gains were. China appears to be flexing those diplomatic muscles again, this time as the reported host of ceasefire talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

We should view any Chinese attempt to shape a settlement with clear-eyed realism and a degree of cautious optimism. Beijing is unlikely to offer security guarantees or shoulder the burden of implementation. Nor is China the neutral actor it likes to present itself as. Deep ties with Tehran may give it leverage, but they also invite suspicion.

Its broader alignment with Russia—another key supporter of Iran—further complicates any claim to being an honest broker. Washington and its allies would almost certainly view any expanded Chinese role through that lens.

Still, for Beijing, the Iran war provides another opportunity to position itself as a voice of reason while scoring another point against the US. That alone may be enough to shore up China’s reputation in the great-power rivalry. ©Bloomberg

The author is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asia politics with a special focus on China.