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4 weeks ago
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Summary
Trump’s National Security Strategy makes one thing clear: America’s interests come first. The Quad’s low billing should not surprise us. As the US pursues its self-interest unabashedly, India needn’t react. Let’s build our strategic muscle to serve Indian interests on our own terms.
President Donald Trump’s vision of how the US should engage the rest of the world, as outlined in America’s National Security Strategy 2025, is unapologetically America First. It views non-first countries as potential markets, partners and allies in keeping the world open for the pursuit of US interests.
To echo Adam Smith, it is not from the benevolence of Uncle Sam’s army, technology or ideals of democracy that the world should expect peace and prosperity, but from its regard for its self-interest.
The US may part with some of what it has to offer, but as part of a deal; it wants free and open access to resources and markets. The document makes a passing mention of a rules-based global order, but its main emphasis is on US sovereignty—cultural and economic, besides political—rather than what’s good for the globe. It views multilateral bodies and forums with suspicion, in line with the US withdrawal from the Paris climate pact and World Health Organisation.
In short, it reflects a Trumpian shift. It also leaves a question mark above the Quad—the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among India, Australia, Japan and the US. A Quad summit of top leaders was supposed to be held this year, as earlier reported, but we now have just a fortnight’s window for it.
America’s strategy outline speaks of the need to keep the Indo-Pacific “free and open” and refers to improving “commercial (and other) relations with India to encourage New Delhi to contribute to Indo-Pacific security, including through continued [Quad] cooperation…”
Other mentions of India suggest a role envisioned for us as a US partner to help secure its allies’ joint position in the Western Hemisphere—and also in Africa, “with regard to critical minerals.”
Plus, our cooperation would be sought to keep the South China Sea’s shipping lanes free of a “toll system” imposed by a “potentially hostile power,” given how we too may suffer.
While China is not always named, it is cast as a rival trader that unfairly runs up huge surpluses with the US, subsidizes domestic industry for dominance of critical supply chains, steals intellectual property and seeks hegemony.
Acknowledgement of India as the only weighty counter in the region may seem natural in this context, but given a triangular link drawn with Pakistan—one that’s denied by New Delhi—in its triumphal section on peace, US silence on that was perhaps foreseeable.
As a country sworn to autonomy, India need not respond to another nation’s stated strategy. But we cannot shrug it off either. It could have various effects. Its dismal view of immigration, for example, could reduce India’s role as a talent source for America Inc, though the latter’s rush to set up AI data and global capability centres here may accelerate.
As for US power projection, a modestly named ‘Trump Corollary’ to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine—which declared the rest of the Americas a US backyard—claims the right to set a policy agenda for more or less half the globe. Europe is expected to reconcile with Russia and dispel thoughts of Nato expansion; Ukraine will have to curb its enthusiasm on that front.
In many ways, the US has opted for geopolitical realism over a high horse. What we must puzzle out is the extent to which the Quad agenda might get set adrift. Trump called India an “important strategic partner” in the Indo- Pacific, as cited by a US Embassy post on X. Whether or not the Quad weakens, India must build strategic muscle and stay in pursuit of all that’s within its control that suits our interests.
English (US) ·