Great power games, oil wars and India’s uneasy balancing act

Was the welcome Putin received in Beijing a touch warmer than Trump’s? Was Xi Jinping’s smile more natural while shaking hands with Putin than with Trump?

Putin was received by Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi as he stepped off the aircraft, in contrast to Trump, who was welcomed by Chinese Vice President Han Zheng. Han is senior in protocol rankings than Wang, of course, but Wang is the more visible face of Chinese foreign policy.

Both Putin and Trump were welcomed similarly at the Great Hall of the People. A Reuters report noted that the Xi-Trump handshake lasted 10 seconds while the Xi-Putin handshake lasted about eight. The Chinese schoolchildren who greeted Trump on arrival were also present for Putin.

But beyond optics, the substance differed sharply.

Trump announced several deals with China, including Boeing aircraft orders, though Beijing took its time confirming them. There was no joint statement; both countries released separate readouts.

In contrast, the Putin-Xi meeting reportedly ended with a 9,000-word joint statement championing a multipolar world order. Around 20 agreements—some Russian reports said 40—were signed.

With the Iran war deepening global energy anxieties, Russia’s assurances of stable energy supplies would have reassured Beijing. Russia, meanwhile, stands to gain as China seeks alternative energy sources to offset potential disruptions.

The resulting energy revenues would also support Russia’s war economy.

Yet one major agreement remained unresolved: the long-discussed Siberia 2 gas pipeline.

What stands out from both visits is China’s unmistakably growing importance in world affairs. Trump and Putin arrived in Beijing with different wish lists, each seeking Chinese buy-in. Both achieved varying levels of success.

But one thing is increasingly undeniable: China’s global weight is growing rapidly. The Trump and Putin visits, along with the steady stream of European leaders travelling to Beijing in recent months, underline that reality.

According to the New York Times, Trump and Netanyahu had discussed installing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran’s leader after Khamenei. The report stunned many observers.

For the uninitiated, Ahmadinejad—Iran’s president from 2005 to 2013—famously called for wiping “Israel off the map,” championed Iran’s nuclear programme, and maintained a fiercely anti-US stance while brutally suppressing protests at home.

In recent years, however, he had clashed with Khamenei and was reportedly placed under house arrest.

The plan to bring him back was apparently conceived by Israel and Ahmadinejad was apparently consulted. But the effort reportedly collapsed after an Israeli strike targeting his residence narrowly missed him, leaving him disillusioned.

That Trump hoped to replicate his Venezuela playbook in Iran had been evident for some time. But the choice of Ahmadinejad was, to put it mildly, highly unusual.

This week, Trump and Netanyahu reportedly held an extremely tense conversation on Iran. Trump was said to favour negotiations while Netanyahu pushed for more strikes.

One colourful account described Netanyahu’s “hair on fire” after the exchange.

CNN reported that Trump delayed strikes after Qatar and Saudi Arabia urged him to give diplomacy another chance.

During the call, Trump reportedly told Netanyahu that mediators were drafting a “letter of intent” between the US and Iran to formally end the conflict. The proposed framework would launch a 30-day negotiation period covering Iran’s nuclear programme and the Strait of Hormuz.

The letter was reportedly drafted by Qatar and Pakistan with input from others.

Netanyahu, however, argued that delays would only help Iran regroup.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir arrived in Tehran on his second mediation mission, according to multiple reports.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also acknowledged “some slight progress” in talks. “I don't want to exaggerate it, but there's been a little bit of movement, and that's good,” he said.

It comes amid sweeping geopolitical realignments and at a time when US-India ties arguably appear more fragile than at any point in the past 25 years, with priorities increasingly diverging.

Energy, trade, defence cooperation and critical technology are all expected to feature on the agenda. There will also be a QUAD foreign ministers’ meeting.

Anyone remember the QUAD? One wouldn’t blame you if you don’t.

Given the new China-US language of “constructive strategic stability” referenced in the Chinese readout after the Trump-Xi talks, the US increasingly seeing China as more of an economic competitor than a military adversary, and Trump’s worldview prioritising the Western Hemisphere, questions naturally arise over what exactly the QUAD now represents.

Perhaps we’ll know next week—or perhaps not.

Will India take up the offer? Can it afford the price? What would it mean for India’s current account deficit and broader economy? And more fundamentally: is the strategic partnership with the US becoming more of a liability for India?

That question becomes even more relevant with Delcy Rodriguez’s India visit.

Washington now wants Venezuelan oil back in global markets, with India viewed as a natural buyer given its large crude imports.

Ironically, it was American sanctions and pressure during Trump’s first term that pushed India to stop buying Venezuelan crude in 2019-20.

Now the US is unhappy with India’s growing purchases of discounted Russian oil, arguing that such purchases help finance Russia’s war in Ukraine. The proposed solution? Replace Russian crude with Venezuelan oil.

Which brings us back to the same uncomfortable question:

Are ties with the US increasingly becoming a liability for India?

Elizabeth Roche is associate professor of International Relations at O.P. Jindal Global University, Haryana.