Just Another Anti-China Platform? Why Trump's Return Has Changed The Quad Equation

Last Updated:May 26, 2026, 10:59 IST

Right now, under Trump 2.0, the Quad’s biggest challenge may be that nobody is entirely sure which direction it is heading

For much of the past five years, the Quad, the strategic grouping of India, United States, Japan and Australia, symbolised the rise of a new Indo-Pacific order.

Leaders met regularly. Joint statements grew sharper on maritime security and China. The grouping expanded cooperation on vaccines, semiconductors, critical minerals, cyber security and infrastructure. Under former US President Joe Biden, the Quad evolved from a loose strategic dialogue into a highly visible geopolitical platform.

But in 2026, a different question is beginning to surface in diplomatic circles: is the Quad quietly losing momentum under Donald Trump 2.0?

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The concern is not that the Quad is collapsing. Rather, analysts are debating whether the grouping is entering a slower, quieter and more uncertain phase—one shaped by the US President’s more transactional foreign policy, diverging priorities among members, and the absence of high-profile summit diplomacy.

Why The Missing Summit Matters

One reason the debate intensified is because the anticipated Quad leaders’ summit expected in India in 2025 never took place.

Technically, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar insists the summit was “never formally scheduled" and therefore was not “cancelled". He has repeatedly argued that observers should not “overread" the absence of a leaders’ meeting because working groups and ministerial-level coordination continue.

But optics matter enormously in geopolitics.

The Quad is not NATO. It has no treaty obligations, no formal secretariat, no collective defence mechanism, and no permanent institutional structure. That means leader-level signalling is central to its credibility.

Analysts writing in The Diplomat argue that the Quad depended heavily on summitry to project political cohesion and strategic deterrence, especially toward China. Without those visible displays of unity, perceptions of drift naturally grow.

How Trump 2.0 Changed The Atmosphere

Ironically, Donald Trump helped revive the Quad during his first presidency in 2017 by sharpening America’s Indo-Pacific focus and framing China as the central strategic challenge.

But Trump’s second term appears different.

Several analysts argue that Trump 2.0 is less focused on alliance-building and more focused on bilateral deals, tariffs, burden-sharing and domestic economic priorities.

That shift matters because the Quad relies heavily on sustained political coordination among its members.

According to analyses in The Diplomat, Trump’s return has complicated Quad diplomacy in several ways: Trade tensions with allies, friction over tariffs, disagreements on strategic autonomy, reduced emphasis on climate and public-goods cooperation, and greater focus on transactional outcomes.

Under Biden, the Quad expanded beyond security into vaccine diplomacy, climate initiatives, emerging technology, infrastructure financing, and supply-chain resilience. However, Trump’s administration appears less interested in many of these broader agendas, preferring harder strategic balancing against China.

That creates a subtle but important change: the Quad risks narrowing from a broad Indo-Pacific partnership into a more limited anti-China coordination platform.

Are The Quad Countries Still Moving Together?

Another reason for anxiety is that the four Quad members increasingly face different strategic realities.

Japan is undergoing its biggest defence transformation since World War II, increasing military spending and pursuing counterstrike capabilities. Its focus is heavily centered on East Asian deterrence and Taiwan contingencies.

Australia, meanwhile, is deeply invested in AUKUS, its submarine and advanced defence technology partnership with the US and UK. For Canberra, AUKUS increasingly dominates strategic planning.

India is balancing multiple identities simultaneously. It is a Quad member, BRICS participant, Global South voice, and strategic autonomy advocate.

New Delhi continues avoiding any framework that resembles a formal anti-China military bloc. Analysts speaking to The Diplomat say India wants the Quad strong enough to balance China, but not so militarised that it appears like an “Asian NATO".

Meanwhile, Washington, under Trump 2.0, appears increasingly unpredictable from the allies’ perspective, especially after tariff disputes and renewed pressure on partners over burden-sharing. The result is not necessarily disunity, but uneven strategic pacing.

But Is The Quad Actually Weakening?

Not everyone agrees.

A competing school of thought argues the Quad is not weakening; it is evolving. Supporters of this view say observers are overly focused on summit optics while ignoring quieter institutional cooperation happening underneath.

Even without leaders’ summits, Quad cooperation continues through maritime domain awareness, critical minerals initiatives, semiconductor coordination, cybersecurity frameworks, supply-chain planning, naval interoperability, and bureaucratic and military working groups.

The argument is that the Quad may be transitioning from symbolic diplomacy to what analysts call “embedded minilateralism"—less theatrical but more operational cooperation.

In this context, the Quad’s quieter phase could actually make it more durable because it becomes less dependent on political personalities.

Why China Still Watches The Quad Closely

Even during periods of reduced visibility, Beijing continues treating the Quad seriously.

China has long criticised the grouping as an attempt to contain its rise and frequently compares it to a potential Asian NATO. The very existence of coordinated Indo-Pacific security architecture worries Beijing because it complicates Chinese maritime and regional ambitions.

That alone may explain why the Quad remains strategically relevant despite current uncertainty.

Its importance lies not merely in military exercises or summits, but in creating habits of coordination among four major Indo-Pacific democracies.

Can The Quad Survive Without Political Momentum?

This may be the real test of Trump 2.0.

Under Biden, the Quad thrived on visible political momentum as there were frequent summits, joint declarations, public diplomacy, and expanding agendas.

But informal coalitions are fragile. If top-level engagement weakens for too long, the risk is not immediate collapse but gradual loss of salience.

That concern is now openly surfacing in strategic circles. Analysts at ORF recently described the Quad as experiencing its “most turbulent period of diplomatic synergy" since its revival in 2017.

So, Is The Quad Quietly Weakening?

The answer depends on what one expects the Quad to be.

If it is judged primarily as a leaders-driven geopolitical symbol, then yes, the absence of summitry, growing divergences and Trump’s transactional approach suggest visible weakening.

But if the Quad is evolving into a quieter long-term coordination mechanism focused on practical Indo-Pacific cooperation, then it may simply be becoming less visible and more institutionalised.

The real danger for the Quad may not be collapse. It may be ambiguity.

Because in geopolitics, alliances and partnerships derive power not only from military capabilities, but also from clarity, signaling and perception. And right now, under Trump 2.0, the Quad’s biggest challenge may be that nobody is entirely sure which direction it is heading.

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