Uncle Sam’s view of the Indo-Pacific: Why India must invest heavily in naval power projection

The NDS, which is meant to guide the US Pentagon, is not a major departure from the NSS in its emphasis on the defence of the Western hemisphere and securing the American homeland. This was visibly demonstrated by the capture of Maduro and Trump’s incessant threats to take control of Greenland. Irrespective of the motivation behind Washington’s decision to align the NDS with strong hemispheric defence, the NDS’s narrowed view of US defence strategy globally is consistent with the NSS. Three aspects of the NDS stand out.

First, greater burden sharing among allies and partners to relieve the US of its role as the world’s apex security provider. The NDS is quite blunt in stating that allies have become a burden for the US; it holds past administrations responsible for turning allies into “dependencies." As a corrective, the NDS makes clear that allies and partners must assume a greater burden of their own defence, especially in Europe against Russia.

Beyond Europe, South Korea has been similarly exhorted—if not quite excoriated like Europe—to assume a greater burden of its defence against any North Korean attack. In West Asia too, allies and partners have been told to do more for their defence, with Iran viewed as the region’s greatest threat.

The second key aspect of the NDS is its case for “peace through strength." This is at the core of the Trump administration’s defence strategy in the Indo-Pacific. It finds further elaboration in the NDS. Fundamentally, “peace through strength" commits the US military to the defence of the First Island Chain (FIC)—a maritime boundary to contain China—through robust deterrence by ‘denial,’ which refers to denying an adversary the ability to meet its aims. Thus, the NDS seeks to incentivize allies to dedicate resources that will bolster collective security in the Indo-Pacific.

Denial-based defence, as per the NDS, can deter aggression more effectively than threats of retaliation. It seeks to deter Beijing without engaging in outright confrontation. This suggests deference to Beijing, perhaps on account of its trade leverage over Washington.

Third, among the key goals of the NDS is to “supercharge" America’s Defence Industrial Base (DIB) so as to consolidate US military power. This commitment to augment and mobilize national resources and bolster the DIB is not new. Previous administrations have done so too, but it reflects how cognisant the Trump administration is of the defence technology challenges confronting the US in the face of China’s expanding military power.

From an Indian standpoint, there were two key features that were conspicuously absent. There was no emphasis or reference to America’s role in the Quadrilateral dialogue. The NDS, unlike the NSS, is silent on the Quad’s role as a security provider and anchor for restraining Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific.

A more menacing interpretation of this notable omission is that Washington is gravitating towards a G-2 arrangement with China, leaving its allies and partners vulnerable to Beijing’s coercion or outright aggression. However, the short shrift given to the Quad in the NDS masks the fact that its four partners conducted a field training exercise as part of the Indo-Pacific Logistics Network (IPLN) in December.

The IPLN is geared to enable rapid and timely responses to contingencies and the provision of military aid to countries in the Indo-Pacific. Bilateral defence engagements between Washington and each individual Quad country, India included, have remained steady. Nevertheless, unlike the NSS, there is no mention of the Quad in the NDS.

India finds no specific mention in the NDS. While the NSS does have a passing reference to New Delhi’s role in the Indo-Pacific, the NDS unabashedly prioritizes the American homeland and Indo-Pacific region while demanding that allies and partners located in the Eurasian landmass shoulder the primary responsibility for their defence, with the US playing at best a supportive role.

To that degree, the NDS is clinical in how the Trump administration plans to deploy US power across the world. Its aim is to concentrate strength where it matters most—the Indo-Pacific. This should encourage New Delhi to bolster its defence capabilities.

In the forthcoming Union budget, New Delhi will need to boost defence spending beyond previous budgetary allocations. The NDS may consider the Indo-Pacific a vital area of national security and interest, but the Indian government must never take US commitment for granted. New Delhi needs to think long-term and allocate greater resources to the projection of naval power in the Indo-Pacific, especially east of Malacca and the Western Pacific.

In the age of Trump, greater willingness to contribute to regional security could offer India insulation from adverse actions by an administration in Washington that has shown a readiness to reject the foundational assumptions of US foreign policy.

The authors are, respectively, vice president for studies, and senior fellow, defence and national security, Observer Research Foundation.